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proceeding to enforce this lien is one in ren.94  An attorney pro-
curing a judgment in the Municipal Court of the City of New York
has a lien enforceable in the Supreme Court.95
The attorney's charging lien takes priority over attaching
creditors. 96
The right to the charging lien is assignable where the assign-
ment carries with it no breach of the attorney's duty to preserve his
client's confidence inviolate.97
Conclusion.
The general attitude of the courts toward attorneys' liens, as
gleaned from the foregoing cases, is one of benevolent despotism.
If the attorney has been ethical, the court will go far to protect his
rights. For example, where an attorney had neither a retaining nor
a charging lien, the court went so far as to create an equitable lien
in his favor.98
From the time he is first retained, an attorney has a retaining
lien on the client's property which comes into his possession. The
retaining lien covers all the services he has rendered and all dis-
bursements made. When the attorney undertakes to prosecute a
claim in the client's favor, he has a charging lien on the proceeds of
the action, but his protection as against third parties operates only
from the time a summons is served.
WILLIAM H. QUASHA.
INCIDENTS OF PRoGREssIvE TAXATION.
"Equity in taxation" observed a learned author I "is an elusive
mistress, whom perhaps it is only worth the while of philosophers to
pursue ardently and of politicians to watch warily." This elusive mis-
.tress has, however, exercised a powei ful influence upon events in the
191 N. E. 842 (1934) ; li re Levin's Estate, 154 Misc. 700, 278 N. Y. Supp. 36
(Surr. Ct. 1935).
Oishei v. Pennsylvania R. R., 117 App. Div. 110, 102 N. Y. Supp. 368
(1st Dept. 1907), off'd meno., 197 N. Y. 544, 85 N. E. 1113 (1908).
'Tynan v. Mart, 53 Misc. 49, 103 N. Y. Supp. 1033 (Sup. Ct. 1907);
Duringshoff v. Coates & Co., 93 Misc. 485, 157 N. Y. Supp. 230 (Sup. Ct.
1916).
'Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N. Y. 508 (1882).
See Leask v. Hoagland, 64 Misc. 156, 164, 118 N. Y. Supp. 1035, 1041
(Sup. Ct. 1909), aff'd ineno., 136 App. Div. 658, 121 N. Y. Supp. 197 (1st Dept.
1910). Cf. text to note 51, smpra.
Schoenherr v. Van Meter, 215 N. Y. 548, 109 N. E. 625 (1915) (Corpora-
tion having appropriated the benefit of an attorney's services, subsequently
became bankrupt and refused payment to the attorney.).
DALTON, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC FINANCE (1929) 94.
NOTES AND COMMENT
realm of taxation in recent years and seems destined to play an even
more important role in the period which lies ahead.2 It would seem
that equity in taxation is a problem for the economist to ponder and
for legislators to enact into law, but where standards, indefinite as they
may be are applied by the Constitution,3 the judiciary becomes the
final arbiter of the tax.
Progressive taxation, in which the amount of tax percentage
levied upon property or income increases with additions in tax base,4
has met with warm approval among economists and political scien-
tists.5  Economists, however, may examine the factors involved in a
tax problem, show that the arguments pro and con are nicely bal-
anced, and then proceed to drop the issue. It is therefore necessary
for the scope of this note to consider, in so far as it is possible, only
the working of the judicial mind, for it is there that the academic
questions of economists become practical questions to which answers
must be given. Unfortunately, perhaps, the courts are human insti-
tutions and the members have human limitations which necessarily in-
clude their own political, social and economic philosophies. 6 Thus it
may be difficult, in the light of present accepted principles of taxation,
to read the challenge and the philosophy of the Supreme Court of the
United States as enunciated some two score years ago, wherein the
Court held a federal tax on income unconstitutional. Said Mr. Jus-
tice Field in the Pollock case 7-the first of the income tax cases:
"The present assault upon capital is but the beginning.
It will be the stepping stone to others, larger and more sweep-
ing till our political contests will become a war of the poor
against the rich; a war constantly growing in intensity and
bitterness."
The challenge of the Pollock case was answered by the Sixteenth
Amendment,8 the philosophy therein enunciated has been inculcated in
2 14 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1934) 540.
'U. S. CONST. Amend. V, XIV.
'FUNK & WAGNALLS, NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY (1925). SELIGMAN,
infra note 5, at p. 3. A tax is progressive when' the relation varies in such a
way that, as the amount taxed itself increases, the tax will represent a con-
tinually larger fraction of that amount.
'SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2d ed.
1908) and authorities therein cited.
'Shientag, Book Review, current issue, p. 379. State Board of Tax Com-
missioners of Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct. 540 (1930). Mr.
Justice Sutherland dissenting. "The decisions have depended not only upon
the varying facts which constituted the background of the particular legislation
under consideration, but also, to some extent, upon the point of view of the
courts or judges who have been called upon to deal with the question." At 550.
'Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 607, 15 Sup. Ct.
673 (1895).
'The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states,
and without regard to any census or enumeration.
1936 ]
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the modus operandi that our tax measures have in many instances
adopted.
Progressive taxation has received but incidental consideration in
the constitutional tests of equality and uniformity. Rates propor-
tioned "to an ability to pay" 9 have met the test of equality when
questioned in the Brushaber 10 income tax case. This was but a re-
iteration of the standards determined in the Pacific Express Co.,,
case and the Bells Gap 12 case that diversity of taxation with respect
to amount, and the state's inherent privilege to impose different rates,
were entirely consistent with uniformity and equality.
Neither in inheritance nor in gift taxation does a progressive
rate raise the constitutional question of arbitrary classification. With
the determination in the Magoun i3 case that the subject taxed was
the privilege, granted by the state, to transmit property, any limita-
tion thereon was proper; while such tax on estates by the Federal
Government would always meet the test of geographical uniformity
established in the Knowlton case.14
'Income Tax Cases, 148 Wis. 456, 134 N. W. 673 (1912). It (income
tax) has been in use in various forms, and generally with the progressive
feature, by many of the civilized governments of the world for decades.
Argument in its favor is that taxation should logically be imposed according to
ability to pay rather than on mere possession of property.
" Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R., 240 U. S. 1, 36 Sup. Ct. 236 (1916).
Progressive rate does not violate equality as based on ability to pay. Income
Tax Cases, 148 Wis. 456, 134 N. W. 673 (1912); Dallas Gas Co. v. State,
1924 Tex. Civ. App., 261 S. W. 1063.
'Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U .S. 339, 351, 12 Sup. Ct. 250
(1892). The Court has repeatedly laid down the doctrine that diversity of
taxation as to amount and class is not inconsistent with perfect uniformity
"* * * and that a system which imposes the same tax upon every species of
property, irrespective of its nature, condition, or class, will be destructive of the
principles of uniformity and equality in taxation. * * *"
'Bell's Gap R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 10 Sup. Ct. 533 (1892).
Different specific rates may be imposed upon different trades and professions,
and the rates of excise may be varied upon various products. Giozza v. Tiernan,
148 U. S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 721 (1893). The Fourteenth Amendment was not
intended to compel the state to adopt an iron rule of equal taxation.
'Magoun v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 18 Sup. Ct.
594 (1898). Held that a state inheritance tax was a levy on the right to trans-
mit and therefore a graduation of tax which discriminated between blood
relatives and those further removed was valid. Dos PASSOS, COLLATERAL IN-
HERITANCE TAX (1890) 20. To effect that a statute is not unconstitutional
where the graduation discriminates between classes and not members of a class.
Keeney v. Comptroller, 222 U. S. 525, 32 Sup. Ct. 105 (1911) ; State v. Handlin,
100 Ark. 175, 139 S. W. 1112 (1911); Kochersperger v. Drake, 67 Ill. 122,
47 N. E. 321 (1897) ; Booth v. Commissioner, 130 Ky. 88, 113 S. W. 61 (1908) ;
Union Trust Co. v. Wagner Probate Judge, 125 Mich. 487, 84 N. W. 1101
(1901); In re Keeney, 194 N. Y. 284, 87 N. E. 428 (1909) ; Nunemacher v.
State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N. W. 627 4:1906).
" Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747 (1900). Case involved
a progressive tax on legacies and transfers of personal property. Any argument
as to the enormity of the tax because of its progressive feature was held to be
without merit.
NOTES AND COMMENT
Gift taxes received a summary disposition by the courts in an
opinion based on the historical concept of such levy as an excise."
A graduated rate was, therefore, but the cause for reaffirmation
that classification by amount was the -fair object of the legislature 16
and not repugnant to the Fifth Amendment 17 nor to the Fourteenth
Amendment's if uniform as to each class taxed.
Progressive taxation is always an incident of franchise taxation
whether of domestic or foreign corporations. But again the question
of uniformity of rates as between the individual 19 and the corpora-
tion 20 or the domestic and foreign corporation has been disposed of
on the state's inherent power 21 to condition and delimit the privilege 
22
of existing as a corporation and to regulate admission 23 for business
"New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 41 Sup. Ct. 506 (1921).
Always treated as a duty or an excise and "on this point a page of history is
worth a volume of logic."
6Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137, 45 Sup. Ct. 424 (1925). State estate tax
levy.
1"Patten v. Brady, 184 U. S. 608, 22 Sup. Ct. 493 (1902); McCray v.
United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 769 (1904) ; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,
220 U. S. 108, 31 Sup. Ct. 342 (1911) (federal tax on corporations for privilege
of exercising franchise); Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 40 Sup. Ct. 2
(1919).
IsBrowmley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. 124, 50 Sup. Ct. 46 (1929). Gift tax.
Scheme of graduation and exemption did not infringe on Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
"Bank of California v. San Francisco, 142 Cal. 276, 75 Pac. 832 (1904).
A tax on corporate franchise does not discriminate where the same is not
imposed on individual.
ISee Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 595, 10 Sup. Ct. 593 (1880).
Tax is on privilege of doing business though the base may be corporate income
from any source, including federal. Blackrock Copper Mining & Milling Co. v.
Tangey, 34 Utah 369, 98 Pac. 180 (1928). Franchise tax is not property tax
and need not conform to uniformity on property.
' Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 595, 600, 10 Sup. Ct. 593 (1880).
"No constitutional objection lies in the way of a legislative body prescribing
any mode of measurement to determine the amount it will charge for the
privilege it bestows." Barclay & Co. v. Edwards, 267 U. S. 442, 45 Sup. Ct.
348 (1924). It may tax foreign and not domestic corporations. National
Paper & Type Co. v. Bowers, 270 U. S. 630, 46 Sup. Ct. 335 (1925).
"'International Trust Co. v. American Loan & Trust Co., 62 Minn. 501,
65 N. W. 78 (1895). "A privilege as distinguished from a mere 'power, is a
right peculiar to the person or class of persons on whom it is conferred. As
applied to a corporation, it is ordinarily used as synonymous with 'franchise'
and means a special privilege conferred by the state which does not belong to
citizens generally of common right, and which cannot be enjoyed or exercised
without legislative authority."
' Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U. S. 1869). State may, for purposes of
admission, classify separately domestic and foreign corporations as to taxing
status. Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U. S. 68, 34 Sup. Ct. 15
(1913) ; People ex rel. Chicago v. Kent, 300 I1. 324, 133 N. E. 276 (1921) ;
International Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 228 Mass. 101, 117 N. E. 246 (1917) ;
Germanic Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 85 Pa. 513 (1877) ; 52 Tex. Civ. App.
634, 115 S. W. 361 (1908) (higher license and franchise tax as condition to
doing business; Commissioner v. United Cigarette Match Co., 119 Va. 447,
89 S. E. 935 (1916). State may domesticate foreign corporation so as to
subject it to taxation on all its property within the state.
1936 ]
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purposes. When, however, a foreign corporation has been admitted
within the state, a graduated tax, which in operation creates a classi-
fication between domestic and foreign corporations, will violate the
Fourteenth Amendment if the foreign corporation has become firmly
established within the state.24 Any graduation in taxes over that of
the domestic corporation will create an arbitrary classification and
an unequal subjection.2 5
A graduated tax has not, of itself, offered a discriminatory
classification of taxpayers until very recently, and that by indirec-
tion. The economic situation 26 created by the conflict between chain
and independent stores, launched the states into regulatory measures
in the form of sales taxes. The attack was reflected in a classifica-
tion of retailers for the purposes of imposing heavier taxes on a
class embracing the chain store. Judicial sanction is given to such
classifications 27 on the theory that the imposition operates with
equal effect on all within the same class.2 8 Logical excuse must be
found for the classification either in differences of operation,2 9 vol-
Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S. 494, 47 Sup. Ct. 179 (1926)
(had acquired a large clientele, which, if compelled to give up, would cause
the ruin of the company.)
' Southern R. R. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 30 Sup. Ct. 287 (1910) ; Kansas
City, Memphis & Birmingham R. R. v. Stiles, 242 U. S. 111, 37 Sup. Ct. 58(1916). After admission foreign corporation stands equal with domestic cor-
poration and any graduated rates thereafter applied must keep on par with
domestic corporation. Air Way Corp. v. Day, 266 U. S. 71, 45 Sup. Ct. 12
(1924) (Ohio statute). Contra: Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S.
147, 38 Sup. Ct. 295 (1918). State does not surrender its power to revise
taxing system by merely licensing the corporation. Facts in this case did not
establish that irreparable injuries would be sustained by the corporation if
forced to leave the state.
' Becker and Hess, Chain Store License Tax (1929) 7 N. C. L. REv. 115.
The conflict of interest between the independent and the chain. "* * * for in
its final analysis, the legislation attempted and enacted but reflects a recognition
of the struggle and the remedies proposed merely accentuate its existence."
nKentucky Railroad Cases, 115 U. S. 321, 6 Sup. Ct. 57 (1885). There
is nothing to forbid the classification of property for purposes of taxation and
the valuation of different classes by different methods. The rule of equality
only requires the same means and methods to be applied impartially to all the
constituents of each class.
I Note (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 121. The tax imposed should operate
on all alike under certain circumstances.
'American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 21 Sup. Ct. 43
(1900) (taxed sugar refiners and exempted refining by planters) ; Quong Wing
v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59, 32 Sup. Ct. 192 (1911) (taxed hand laundries and
not machine laundries) ; Bradley v. Richmond, 227 U. S. 477, 33 Sup. Ct. 318
(1913) (higher graduated rate on private banks lending money at high rate,
and low rate on commercial banks) ; Metropolis Theatre v. Chicago, 228 U. S.
61, 33 Sup. Ct. 444 (1913) (a tax graduated with the increase in theatre ticket
prices) ; Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U. S. 304, 315, 34 Sup.
Ct. 493 (1914) (license fee higher on those delivering in person than by wagon).
"difference in mode of doing business between the local tradesman and itinerant
dealer, and we are unable to say that the disti nction made between them for
the purposes of taxation is arbitrarily made."
[ VOL. 10
NOTES AND COMMENT
ume of business,30 or administrative ability.31
With these thoughts before us an examination of the Stewart
Dry Goods Co.3 2 case should be fruitful. The tax imposed on re-
tailers was graduated in proportion to the volume of gross sales(the first $400,000 at one rate and a percentage increase with each
additional $100,000). Since this tax is clearly not a privilege nor
estate tax it cannot invoke the peculiar principles applicable there.
A classification according to volume of sales had been indirectly ap-
proved in the Jackson 3 and the Ligget 34 cases where there was
ample proof that with the increase in the number of stores there
would be a corresponding increase in gross sales. A factor common
in all of these cases was the graduated rate which generally involves
the "ability to pay" doctrine in a test of constitutional equality.
The majority of the court was of the opinion that volume of sales
was not, by itself, a sufficient indication of ability to pay and there-
fore (though a comparison with adjudicated classifications would
not reveal the difference) 3 5 the tax was invalid as an arbitrary
burden. It is submitted that the majority opinion is based upon a
finding of fact. A close reading of the facts presented leads to a
sympathetic adoption of the closing sentences of the dissenting opin-
ion.36 "In fine, there may be classification for the purpose of taxa-
tion according to the nature of the business. There may be classifi-
cation to size and the power and opportunity of which size is an
exponent. Such has been the teaching of the law books, at least
until today." There may also be a progressive tax which will in-
volve no discriminating burden if the classification is proper.
The principles of progressive taxation must be viewed in the
light of Chief Justice Marshall's oft-quoted statement that the power
' Clark v. Titusville, 184 U. S. 329, 22 Sup. Ct. 382 (1902). Tax graduated
with increase in sales. Citizens Telephone Co. v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 322, 33 Sup.
Ct. 833 (1913). In taxing telephone companies, those within a class doing
less than $500 were exempted.
"Penny Stores, Inc. v. Mitchell, 59 F. (2d) 789 (S. D. Miss. 1932), aff'd,
287 U. S. 672, 53 Sup. Ct. 95. Rate graduated with increase in stores. Differ-
ence is not in ownership but in organization. It may seem arbitrary to draw
the line between five and six stores, but such a line exists where the metamor-
phosis in organization takes place. At 792.
'Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550, 55 Sup. Ct. 525, cert.
denied, 295 U. S. 768, 55 Sup. Ct. 525 (1935).
'State Board of Tax Commissioners of Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527.
51 Sup. Ct. 540 (1931). One store paid tax of $3.00; two to five stores paid$10.00 with an increase in rate corresponding to increase in ownership of stores.
Held, not capricious or arbitrary.
'Louis K. Eigget Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 53 Sup. Ct. 481 (1933). Tax
was measured by number of stores in county. The distinction is the occasion
for the classification.
" Cf. with cases cited in suepra notes 29, 30 and 31. Spreckles Sugar Refin-
ing Co. v. McClain, 192 U. S. 397, 24 Sup. Ct. 376 (1904); Pacific American
Fisheries v. Alaska, 269 U. S. 269. Contra: Quaker City Cab Co. v. Com-
monwealth of Pa.. 277 U. S. 389, 48 Sup. Ct. 553 (1927). Discrimination
between company and individual operators.
Mr. Justice Cardozo.
1936 ]
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to tax involves the power to destroy.37  In the absence of constitu-
tional prohibition, the legislature has the right finally to determine
the amount or rate of a tax.3 8  During a period in which large ex-
penditures are deemed necessary, the power to meet these needs
must not be limited, even though the vigor with which the power to
raise revenue may be employed, is burdensome and oft confiscatory.
If taxes, heavy though they may be, are to be levied, they should be
so distributed as to promote a desired social policy. "Ability or fac-
ulty to pay" has come to be the test in determining the justness of
taxation.39 And it appears that in all possible situations the pres-
ence of a progressive rate offers no obstacle to the validity of the
tax measure, provided that a proper classification has been accom-
plished.40 Proper classification revolves about the ability to pay, for
it is "not only the basis of taxation but the goal towards which so-
ciety is steadily working. It lies instinctively and unconsciously at
the bottom of all our endeavors at tax reform." 41
IRVING DIAMOND,
BORIS KOSTELANETZ.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
' COOLEY, THE LAW OF TAXATION (1924) 178; Fairbanks v. United States,
181 U. S. 283, 21 Sup. Ct. 648 (1901).
' State ex rel. Foot v. Bazile, 97 Minn. 11, 106 N. W. 93 (1905).
' The revenue measure, now under consideration, providing for a progres-
sive tax on undistributed surplus should encounter no difficulties because of the
graduated rate.
" SELIGMAN, TAXATION (1895) 72.
[ VOL. 10
